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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RECOGNITION OF
THE FAMILIES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
THOMAS S. HIxsON*
"This is not prejudiced legislation .... It is a preemptive
measure to make sure that a handful of judges, in a single
State, cannot impose an agenda upon the entire Nation."1 -
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), in support of the
Defense of Marriage Act,2 which denies federal and interstate
recognition to same-sex marriages.
Senator Lott-and many of those who agree with him - would
doubtlessly be disappointed to learn that despite the enactment of
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the legal recognition of gay
and lesbian families is not just the radical social agenda of a few iso-
lated judges, but is in fact an emerging reality in multiple states. The
simple truth is that DOMA notwithstanding, over the past couple of
decades the gay rights movement has achieved a measure of success
in its consistent aspiration to gain legal and social recognition for
gay and lesbian families.3 Although the majority ofjurisdictions do
not legally recognize gay and lesbian families, and the majority of
employers do not provide private recognition either, there have nev-
ertheless been significant gains for gay and lesbian families in some
states and localities. This article analyzes the various ways in which
gays and lesbians have succeeded in gaining public (that is, legal)
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1997. Thanks to Professor William Rubenstein for all his help.
1. 142 CONG. REC. Sl0101 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (Statement of Sen. Lott); See also
Linda Bowles, A Case Against Same-Sex Marriages, CHICAGO TRm., Sept. 18, 1996, at 23 (quoting
Senator Trent Lott).
2. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
3. See geraUy Arthur S. Leonard, Lesbian and Gay Families and the Law: A Progress Report, 21
FORDHAii URB. L.J. 927, 929-30 (1994) (arguing that "significant advances have been made to-
ward the acknowledgement of lesbian and gay families as social structures worthy of social rec-
ognition and support ... .); William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A Reflection on the SearchforLe-
gal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationship 8 J.L. & PoLITICs 89 (1991) (discussing the
successes and limitations of achieving legal and social recognition of gay and lesbian families
through thejudiciary). Cf Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians
and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567 (1994-95)
(discussing the controversy within the gay legal community about the proper means of gaining
legal recognition for gay families).
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and private recognition for their families.
The patterns that have emerged after countless cases and numer-
ous employer actions are simple. Public actors, whether courts or
legislative bodies, if they are willing to grant legal recognition to gay
and lesbian families, generally do so only indirectly. They grant legal
recognition to unmarried couples as a whole and allow gays and les-
bians to benefit derivatively from their membership in this larger
class of unmarried people. The breakdown of traditional concepts
of family in the past several decades has led to increased legal recog-
nition that unmarried couples can be "family" in the legal sense of
that term.4 Indirectly, this recognition has benefited gays and lesbi-
ans. If a court today is faced with a statute that allows members of a
decedent's "family" to collect workers' compensation benefits for the
death of the decedent,5 or if a court is faced with a statute that per-
mits a dead tenant's "family members" to remain living in a rent-
controlled apartment after the death of the tenant,6 it is possible
that the court will construe the term "family" to include long-term
cohabitants and not merely spousal or blood relations. This chang-
ing notion of the legal family has obvious implications for gay rights.
The instant a court is willing to say that "family" does not mean
"married," the path is open to gays and lesbians to have their rela-
tionships recognized too. This is the public method of recognizing
gay and lesbian families. When courts and legislatures have discon-
nected a legal consequence from the fact of being married and have
permitted that legal consequence to attach also to unmarried rela-
tionships, gays and lesbians have been able to gain some legal recog-
nition of family status. However, it is usually only through member-
ship in this larger class of unmarried people that gays and lesbians
have attained any degree of legal or public recognition of their family
status.
Private employers, on the other hand, have largely taken a differ-
ent approach to recognizing gay and lesbian families in the private
sector. The principal means is by attaching employee benefits-such
as health insurance, membership in a dental plan, or some other
kind of benefit-to an employee's status of being in a relationship. 7
4. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), discussed infra at note 47; Rebecca
L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmaried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Defini-
tions of 'Family" 29J. FAM. L. 497, 497-98 (1991) (analyzing the inadequacy of traditional legal
definitions of family in a time when increasing numbers of people live in alternative arrange-
ments that do not fit within the traditional definition).
5. See Department of Indus. Relations v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 156 Cal.
Rptr. 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), discussed infra at note 27 & accompanying text.
6. SeeBraschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989), discussed infra at note 44.
7. See Samuel Goldreich, PartnerBenefs Tougher Issue For SmallFrms, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 4,
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Traditionally, employers have tied such benefits to marriage, and eli-
gible employees have received some form of spousal benefits. Re-
cently, however, there has been a dramatic growth in the number of
employers who tie certain employee benefits to domestic partner-
ship, that is, a committed relationship in which the partners are not
married.8 What is interesting is the way in which private employers
have defined domestic partnership. The majority of private employ-
ers who give such benefits allow only same-sex couples to register as
domestic partners; opposite-sex couples must be married to qualify
for the benefits.9 The private approach, then, is not to grant recogni-
tion to unmarried couples generally and to gay couples only inciden-
tally, but rather to recognize heterosexual couples in the traditional
way (marriage) and to recognize unmarried couples only when they
are homosexual.
The private approach is a stark contrast to the public approach. It
suggests an equivalence between same-sex and opposite-sex relation-
ships, and in that sense is a more radical challenge to the marriage
laws. In another sense, however, it is less radical than the public ap-
proach, for in denying benefits to unmarried heterosexual couples,
it seems to preserve the idea that marriage ought to mean something
and that domestic partnership ought to simulate marriage to the ex-
tent possible.
This article analyzes these public and private approaches to recog-
nizing gay and lesbian families. The first section discusses the public
method. It considers the various means some courts have used to
recognize gay and lesbian families, including dynamic statutory in-
terpretation, second parent adoption, the common law, and adult
adoption. It also discusses the creation of domestic partnership reg-
istries by municipalities and a few other legislative bodies. The sec-
ond section discusses domestic partnership in the private sphere and
1996 at B8 (discussing the trend among large corporations of offering health insurance to same-
sex partners of employees; often employees must fill out forms attesting to the long term nature
of their relationship); Jennifer Steinhauer, Increasingly Employers Offer Benefits to All Partners, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1994 at A25 (citing the example of the Village Voice in New York City, which
offers insurance benefits to all unmarried partners, but requires couples to prove they have
lived together a year, as only one of many companies offering benefits to unmarried couples,
heterosexual and homosexual).
8. See HEwrrr Assocs., DOMESTIC PARTNERS AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, (1994 & Supp.
1996), discussed infra at Part II. See also Steinhauer, supra note 7, at A25 (discussing the growth
of domestic partnership packages).
9. See HEWrrr Assocs., supra note 8; Goldreich, supra note 7, at B8 (discussing IBM's pol-
icy of covering only homosexual employees under their domestic partnership plan because,
quoting an IBM spokesperson, "They [heterosexual couples) can go down to city hall and get a
marriage license"); Steinhauer, supra note 7, at A25 (citing insurance experts who have found
that the majority of "companies and universities limit domestic partnership programs to same-
sex couples, reasoning that heterosexuals have the option to marry").
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attempts to explain why public and private actors behave so differ-
ently in this area. Finally, the third section considers the theoretical
and practical implications of these different approaches to the social
recognition of gay families.
I. THE PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF GAYAND LESBIAN FAMILIES
Marriage is the traditional way in which the legal system has rec-
ognized private sexual/loving relationships.' 0 This "recognition"
takes the form of the attachment of legal consequences to the fact of
being married. Many states permit only married couples to adopt
children, to file joint income tax returns, or to sue each other for fi-
nancial support upon dissolution of the relationship." Marital
status sweeps broadly, however, and is not confined to these areas.
Zoning laws often distinguish between related and unrelated cohabi-
tants.1 2 Most states permit physically unhurt bystanders to sue for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress upon witnessing an ac-
cident only if the bystander is married to the victim. 13 Testacy laws
permit automatic inheritance only between married people, other
legal relations, or blood relatives. 14 The list goes on indefinitely.
Rather than address each and every consequence of marriage, for
convenience I will refer to all of the legal consequences collectively
as the "institutionalization" of marriage. This institutionalization is
what transforms marriage from symbolism to legal reality.
This institutionalization is also what makes opposite-sex-only mar-
riage laws a powerful source of inequality between heterosexuals and
homosexuals. As long as any legal consequence is attached to mar-
riage-and only to marriage-it is necessarily denied to gays and les-
bians. As a consequence, the legal recognition of gay families has
depended crucially on the untying of legal benefits from marital
status. 15  This section discusses the three general ways in which
10. Cf. Melton, supra note 4, at 497-98 (discussing the failure of the legal system to keep
pace with the changing realities of American family structures).
11. See Melton, supra note 4, at 497-98 (discussing benefits that are often denied to part-
ners, parents and children living in alternative family arrangements).
12. See Melton, supra note 4, at 498.
13. Sep e.g., Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875-78 (Ct. App. 1987) (dismissing a claim
of negligent infliction of emotional distress brought by a homosexual man who witnessed an
assault on his life partner); Reynolds v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 1294, 1297 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (dismissing a woman's emotional distress claim based upon the death of
her six-year boyfriend because she had no legally cognizable relationship with the deceased);
Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (N.M. 1983) (holding that the dose relationship re-
quired for bystander recovery requires an intimate familial relationship limited to husband and
wife).
14. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 52-53 (N.Y. 1989).
15. See Melton, supra note 4, passim (arguing that the legal benefits attendant to marriage
[V'ol. 5:501
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courts have separated legal benefits from marital status, it discusses
the way in which some legislative bodies have begun to do the same,
and it concludes by noting what all these legal approaches have in
common.
A. Dynamic statutory interpretation16
Perhaps the most straight-forward way in which courts have begun
to de-institutionalize marriage is to read the word "family" to refer to
unmarried as well as married couples. 17 The leading case in this area
in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co.,18 in which the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that the word "family" in the noneviction provision of New
York City's rent-control laws includes the longtime partners of ten-
ants.19 The plaintiff in that case, Miguel Braschi, had lived with his
male partner Leslie Blanchard in a rent-controlled apartment in New
York City.20 When Blanchard died of AIDS, the landlord attempted
to evict Braschi.21 Braschi sued for injunctive relief, arguing that he
was entitled to stay in the apartment pursuant to a regulation that
provided that upon the death of the tenant, the landlord could not
evict "either the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some
other member of the deceased tenant's family who has been living
with the tenant."22 The court rejected the landlord's contention that
only marriage or blood relations constituted family:
The determination as to whether an individual is entitled to non-
eviction protection should be based upon an objective examina-
tion of the relationship of the parties.... [Ilt is the totality of the
relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-
sacrifice of the parties which should, in the final analysis, control.23
Braschi's approach of extending the meaning of family to commit-
should be extended to groups of people who live in certain "alternative family" arrangements).
16. To read statutes "dynamically" is to interpret them "in light of their present societal,
political, and legal context." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987). Such an approach regards the present social context of laws "as most
important when the statutory text is not clear and the original legislative expectations have
been overtaken by subsequent changes in society and law." Id. at 1484.
17. For a comprehensive survey of cases that have engaged in "dynamic statutory interpre-
tation" in this manner, see Heidi A. Sorensen, Note, A New Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 81 GEO. LJ. 2105, 2121-28 (1993).
18. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
19. Id. at 52-54 (noting in addition that the term "family" was undefined in the New York
Rent and Eviction Regulations).
20. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at50-51.
21. See Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 95 (stating that Blanchard died of AIDS, a fact not in-
cluded in the opinion of the NewYork Court of Appeals).
22. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 50.
23. Id. at 55.
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ted couples, whether married or not (and thereby indirectly benefit-
ing gays) is not unique. In State v. Hadinger,24 an Ohio appeals court
took the same approach in holding that the crime of "domestic vio-
lence" includes violence between unmarried cohabitants, including
(in that case) two lesbians.25 In Donovan v. County of Los Angeles &
State Compensation Ins. Fund,26 a California Worker's Compensation
Appeals Board held that the same-sex partner of a worker who was
killed in an industrially caused death was a member of the worker's
household for purposes of the Workers' Compensation statute be-
cause neither "household" nor "family" were limited to marriage or a
heterosexual relationship. 27
We might take these representative cases together and term this
approach the Braschi approach: A court interprets the word "family"
not to require marriage between a couple, and this allows gay and
lesbian couples to qualify as family. Conceptually, the Braschi ap-
proach should be understood as an alternative to another approach,
which has been adopted by no court in this country, where "family"
means married couples and unmarried same-sex couples, but not
unmarried opposite-sex couples. At a purely logical level, there is no
reason why a court need prefer the Braschi approach to this alterna-
tive. Braschi itself purported to perform a realistic assessment of the
couple's relationship to see if it constituted "family." The court
might easily have said that since marriage is always an option for op-
posite-sex couples, those opposite-sex couples who have not chosen
to marry have not committed themselves to each other sufficiently to
be termed "family." However since same-sex couples can never be
married no matter how committed the two men or two women might
be to each other, marital status indicates absolutely nothing for
them, so the court should instead perform a realistic assessment of
their relationship to determine if they are "family." Instead, Braschi
and every case like it have refused to equate a gay relationship with a
married-straight relationship. Generally, gay rights come in through
the back-door of rights for unmarried couples.
This back door is not merely theoretical, but legal as well. Before
Braschi was decided, earlier New York cases had construed the term
24. 573 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio 1991). The statute at issue in Handinger defined "person living
as a spouse 'as one who is living .... with the offender in a common law marital relation, [or]
who otherwise is cohabitating with the offender ... '" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(E) (2)
(Anderson 1996). The court construed this definition to include all persons who are cohabitat-
ing, regardless of their sex. Handinger573 N.E.2d at 1193.
25. Id. at 1193.
26. 73 LA 385-107, slip op. (Cal. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., Nov. 3, 1983).
27. See Donovan, at 3-4.
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"family" in a variety of contexts to include unmarried couples, who,
on the facts of those cases, happened to be heterosexual. 28 Braschi
simply took that approach and applied it to a gay couple. Donovan
also followed an earlier decision that applied the same rule of law to
the factual scenario of an unmarried straight couple.29 In some
sense, Hadinger reflected this chronology as well, as the statute the
court was interpreting expressly allowed for "cohabitants" to be cov-
ered, and the only question was whether same-sex cohabitants also
qualified.30 This strand of cases, then, illustrates how lawsuits by
unmarried heterosexual couples can pave the way for later suits by
gay and lesbian couples. As an historical matter one can take this
thesis farther, in that to date, no court has construed a statutory ref-
erence to "family" to include a same-sex couple unless there was al-
ready precedent in that jurisdiction construing "family" to include
unmarried couples. Gay and lesbian families gain legal recognition
in this area only when all unmarried couples do.
This choice by courts to read statutory definitions of "family"
broadly has been particularly significant for gays and lesbians in the
context of second-parent adoption.3 ' Because the two partners in a
same-sex relationship obviously cannot both be the biological par-
ents of the same child, gays and lesbians must use some method of
adoption in order for both partners to have a legal relationship to
28. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (relying on prior cases as
determining "family" to be defined by the "reliance placed upon one another for daily family
services").
29. See Department of Indus. Relations v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 156 Cal.
Rptr. 183, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a woman who was living with a man to whom
she was not married at the time of his death could be considered a member of his household for
purposes of worker's compensation benefits due to the "good faith" nature of their relation-
ship).
30. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (Anderson 1996); State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d
1191, 1192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (basing their decision on a combination of legislative intent
and the ordinary meaning of cohabitation as "the act of living together," which is not sexually
specific, thus finding that same-sex partners should not be excluded from protection under the
Domestic Violence Statute at issue).
31. An attempt to gain this type of legal recognition is generally referred to as a second
parent adoption. For a general discussion of courts' approach in this area, see Suzanne Bryant,
Second Parent Adoption: A Model Brief 2 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 233 (1995) (presenting legal
arguments that were accepted by a Texas court that permitted a second parent adoption by the
child's lesbian co-parent);Julia F. Davies, Note, Two Moms and a Baby: Protecting the Nontraditional
Family Through Second Parent Adoptions, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1055 (1995) (discussing traditional
obstacles to second parent adoption in lesbian families and explaining the significance of grant-
ing legal status to lesbian co-parents and their children); MarlaJ. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creat-
ing Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedomn, 3 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 183, 238-39 (1995) (discussing the manner in which parenthood becomes an op-
tion for gay men through surro-gay arrangements); Recent Case, Massachusetts Allows Biological
Mother and Her Lesbian Partner to Adopt a Child, 107 HARV. L. REV. 751 (1994) (examining the
decision of the SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts in Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315
(Mass. 1993), in which the court allowed a second parent adoption in a lesbian-mother family).
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the child. One option is where one partner is the biological parent
of the child, and her partner seeks to become a "second parent" by
adoption. This second-parent adoption can pose legal problems for
gay and lesbian couples. Many state adoption statutes contain a "cut-
off' provision providing that if a child is adopted, the biological par-
ents automatically lose parental rights over the child. 32 The cut-off
provision is typically accompanied by a step-parent exception, which
provides that the biological parent does not lose parental rights if
the new adoptive parent is the spouse of the biological parent.33 The
hurdle for gays and lesbians is getting a court to accept that the
same-sex partner of the biological parent is a "spouse" within the
meaning of the adoption statute.
Notwithstanding the textual difficulties (which vary state by state)
with the argument that a same-sex partner is a spouse, numerous
courts, including three state supreme courts, have allowed gay and
lesbian second-parent adoption.34 Despite the differences in lan-
guage between the various state adoption statutes, the reasoning in
these cases is essentially the same. In each case, the court refers to
the overriding intent of the legislature that adoption is intended to
be in the best interest of the child.3 5 The court then notes the policy
32. See Bryant, supra note 31, at 233-35 & n.6.
33. SeeBryant, supra note 31, at 235.
34. See In re Adoption of A.O.L., No. 154-85-25 P/A (Alaska Super. Ct., Juneau 1985); In re
Adoption of a Minor Child, No. 1Ju-86-73 P/A (Alaska Super. Ct.,Juneau 1987); In re Adoption
Petition of Carol, No. 18573 (Cal. Super. CL, San Francisco Co. 1989); In re Adoption Petition
of Roberta Achtenberg, No. AD 18490 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Co. 1989); In re Adoption
Petition of Nancy M., No. 18744 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Co. 1990); In re Petition of L.S.
and V.L., Nos. A269-90 and A270-90, 17 F.L.R. (BNA) 1523 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fain. Div. 1991)
(holding that statutory language requiring termination of a natural parent's rights to effectuate
an adoption is directory and not mandatory, and that the language may be waived in cases
where an adoption is in the best interest of the child); Adoption of Susan, 619 N.E. 2d 323
(Mass. 1993) (finding that a statute governting adoptions does not prohibit a probate court from
considering an adoption petition brought jointly by a biological mother and her lesbian part-
ner); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (determining that the Massachusetts
adoption statute does not preclude same-sex cohabitations from jointly adopting a child); In re
Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that a statute requiring termination of a biological
parent's parental rights before an adoption may occur does not apply to a biological mother
when her lesbian partner petitions to adopt her child); In re Adoption of Camilla, 620 N.Y.S. 2d
897 (Farn. Ct., Kings Co. 1994) (stating that stepparent exemptions from provisions that require
a prospective adoptive parent to obtain preplacement certification also apply to adoption by a
lesbian partner of the biological mother); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S. 2d 997 (Surrogate
Ct., N.Y. Co. 1992) (stating that NewYork law does not prohibit an adoption of a six-year-old boy
by his mother's lesbian partner); In re Child #1 and Child #2, No 89-5-0067-7 (Wash. Super. Ct.,
Thurston Co. 1989); In re E.B.G., No 87-5-00137-5 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston Co. 1989);
Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (holding that "when the family
unit is comprised of the natural mother and her [lesbian] partner, and the adoption is in the
best interests of the children, terminating the natural mother's rights is unreasonable and un-
necessary"). Cf. In re M.M.D. and B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. App. 1995) (allowing second-
parent adoption where the first parent was the adoptive, not biological, parent of the child).
35. See In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E. 2d at 318 (finding that the "primary purpose of the
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reasons behind the step-parent exception,3 6 considers the conflict
between the best interest of the child and the rigid enforcement of
the cut-off provision,3 7 and reads the cut-off provision out of the
statute.38 Often the adoption statutes in question are very old laws,
and the court expresses an interest in interpreting the statute in
light of changing social circumstances in a manner that best fulfills
the intent of the legislature, in other words, promoting the best in-
terest of the child.39
One primary constant in almost all of these second-parent adop-
tion cases is that the cut-off provision is read completely out of the
statute, not just as to same-sex couples. The benefit that same-sex
couples receive derives from the court's recognition that unmarried
couples in general can be in committed, responsible relationships.
To date, no court has held that the step-parent exception includes
the partners of same-sex couples on the ground that their relation-
ship is the equivalent of a married one, or that the cut-off provision
should not apply to them for the same reason. The only possible ex-
adoption statute ... is ... the advancement of the best interests of the subject child"); In rejacob,
660 N.E. 2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that their "primary loyalty must be to the statute's leg-
islative purpose-the child's best interest"); In re Adoption of Camilla, 620 N.Y.S 2d 897, 903
(Fam. Ct. Kings Co. 1994) (noting that the historical analysis of the adoption statute involved
centered on the "best interest" of the child"); Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d
1271, 1273 (Vt. 1993) (stating that an adoption statute must be interpreted in light of the fact
that the "state's primary concern is to promote the welfare of children.").
36. See id. at 1274 (discussing the intent of the legislature to "protect the security of family
units" and the interest of a child who finds herself "in circumstances that do not involve two
biological parents"); In reJacob, 660 N.E. 2d at 403 (finding that intra family adoptions where
the biological parent is a party, do not require the same procedural safeguards meant to protect
the adoptive parent for example, when the biological parent is not a party to the adoption and
is waiving their rights as parents); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S. 2d 997, 1000 (Surrogate Ct.,
N.Y.6 1992) (noting that New York law does "not require a destructive choice between the two
parents," adoptive and biological, where they are co-parents).
37. See id. (concluding that where a narrow reading of the statute would "terminate the
parental rights of a biological parent who intended to continue raising a child with the help of a
partner" it would be "unreasonable and irrational" to allow the narrow construction to prevail
over the best interest of the child); "); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E. 2d at 321 (finding that in
considering the adoption statute as a whole and the purpose of protecting the interest of the
child, the termination provision must be read as only applying when the natural parent is not a
party to the adoption); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S. 2d at 1000 (arguing that to strictly en-
force the cut off provision would be an "absurd outcome which would nullify the advantage
sought by the adoption").
38. See id. at 1273-76 (holding that by "allowing same-sex adoptions to come within the step-
parent exception ... we are furthering the the purposes of the statute as was originally in-
tended" to protect the best interest of the child); In reJacob, 660 N.E. 2d at 405 (rejecting the
cut off provision in light of the specific circumstances of the adoption on the principle that
"[w]here the language of a statute is susceptible to two constructions, the courts will adopt that
which avoids injustice ... ") (citations omitted).
39. See id. at 1275 (noting that statutes must be interpreted so as to "not frustrate the pur-
poses behind their enactment"); In reAdoption of Camila, 620 N.Y.S. 2d at 901 (noting the evolv-
ing nature of the nuclear family since the adoption statute was enacted).
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ception is a case before the Vermont Supreme Court,40 in which the
court focused heavily on the fact that although the legislature might
not have forseen the application of the cut-off provision to same-sex
couples when they drafted 15 V.SA § 448 of the Vermont State
Code,41 the intent of the legislature was clearly in favor of the best
interest of the child. Legislative intent would thus be violated if the
courts denied the same-sex partner of a biological parent the right to
adopt the child without terminating the rights of the biological par-
ent.42 However, the court failed to specify whether its allowance of
second-parent adoptions extended only to same-sex couples or to all
unmarried couples, and the dicta can be read either way.43 The
Vermont case notwithstanding, the general pattern in second-parent
adoption follows the Braschi approach of interpreting the word
"family."44 Legal recognition of same-sex families does not purport
to equate same-sex families with married relationships, but rather al-
lows them some measure of recognition through their membership
in the class of all unmarried couples. The only real difference be-
tween the second-parent cases and the Braschi cases is that in the
former there is sometimes no heterosexual court precedent for the
gay plaintiffs to build upon. That is, the first time a court reads the
cut-off provision out of the adoption statute may be when a same-sex
couple is before it. In Braschi, the court had the support of lower
court decisions which had already carried out the notion of looking
beyond the formalities of a relationship to other factors including
the "exclusivity and longevity of the relationship" and how the par-
ties have "held themselves out to society" in order to make an objec-
tive analysis of the parties relationship. 45 Even with this difference,
however, the same conceptual model is at work in both approaches.
Courts increasingly recognize gay and lesbian couples as a subset of
the class of unmarried people in long-term relationships deserving of
legal recognition.
B. The Common Law Power to Contract
A second way in which courts have untied legal benefits from mar-
riage is through the common law power of individuals to contract. A
40. Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.LV.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
41. See id. at 1274.
42. See id. at 1276.
43. See id.
44. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that the term
"family" should be based on the reality of family life and not limited to those who have a formal-
ized relationship by virtue of adoption or a marriage certificate).
45. Id. at 55.
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handful of courts have allowed gay couples to simulate a particular
aspect of marriage through the creation of a private contract and
thereby to gain some legal recognition of their status as a family.46
As with the Braschi approach and second-parent adoption, these
cases allow gay and lesbian couples to walk in the door opened by
unmarried heterosexuals.
Palimony suits are one entrie in this field. In its famous 1976 deci-
sion Marvin v. Marvin,47 the California Supreme Court recognized
the legal validity of an oral contract for mutual support and division
of property made by an unmarried heterosexual couple.48 The
popular press quickly dubbed the claim in that case a "palimony"
suit,49 reflecting the view that the court had effectively bestowed two
traditional aspects of marriage-the division of property between the
spouses and the payment of alimony upon divorce-upon unmar-
ried couples.50 The logic of Marvin was clearly beneficial for same-
sex couples, and in the 1988 decision Whorton v. Dillingham,51 a lower
court allowed a palimony suit arising from the dissolution of a gay
male couple's relationship. 52 The Supreme Court of Georgia re-
cently allowed a very similar suit in Crooke v. Gilden.53 The five-
paragraph opinion does not disclose that the couple in question was
same-sex, nor does it specify what the allegedly "immoral" actions
were that the lower court felt voided the written contract that the
parties had for the "mutual contribution toward improvement of real
estate and sharing of expenses and assets."54 However, this too was
46. See Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that an
oral cohabitation agreement between a same-sex couple was enforceable based on consideration
independent of sexual services); Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (holding that a
contract for "mutual contribution toward improvement of real estate and sharing of expenses
and assets" is not void on the basis of parol evidence showing an "illegal and immoral relation-
ship between parties"); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that agree-
ment between a same-sex couple to raise a child was not per se unenforceable and the most im-
portant element in a custody settlement is the best interest of the child).
47. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
48. See id. at 109-10.
49. See LaBarbara Bowman, From Altar to Palimony, WASH. POST, July 3, 1979 (discussing a
suit between a same sex couple for breach of a verbal agreement similar to Marvin palimony
suit); Alexandra Jacobs, How Palimony Began, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, Feb. 16, 1996, at 76
(discussing the Marvin v. Marvin suit and its groundbreaking precedent); Eileen Keerdoja &Jeff
B. Copeland, The Trials of Unmariage, NEWsWvEE, Oct. 8, 1979 (discussing the court award of
$104,000 to Michelle Marvin arising out of the Marvin v. Marvin "palimony" suit).
50. In fact, the court's decision in Marvin was that the parmers' reasonable expectations of
support in a long standing relationship should not be discounted merely because the parties are
unmarried. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122.
51. 248 Cal.Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
52. Seeid.at406.
53. 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
54. Id. at 646.
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essentially a gay palimony suit like the one in horton.
Another method of using a common law contract to bypass the in-
ability to legally marry is through a co-parent visitation agreement.
In A. C. v. C.B., 55 a New Mexico appeals court held that under New
Mexico law, a visitation agreement between a biological parent and
her same-sex partner specifying the partner's rights to visit the child
was enforceable even after the same-sex relationship ended.56 The
court built on the best interest of the child theory and on New Mex-
ico precedent that upheld a custody agreement between a natural
mother and a stepfather. 57 The court also referred to a California
case, Nancy S. v. Michele G.,58 in asserting that based on the relation-
ship that the nonparent had with the child, she had standing to pur-
sue enforcement of the visitation agreement.59
The point of this section, as with this entire article, is not to survey
the status of the laws governing gay and lesbian families in all fifty
states, but to analyze the pattern of successes. The three cases men-
tioned here-Whorton v. Dillingham, Crooke v. Gilden, and A.C. v.
C.B.-represent the high point in attempts to use the common law
of contract to attain legal recognition of gay and lesbian families. It
is striking that these cases follow a pattern analogous to that of the
Braschi approach and second-parent adoption. In each case, the
courts permitted the recognition of gay families by fitting the cou-
ples into pre-existing options created for unmarried heterosexuals.
The path from Marvin to Worton is paradigmatic: Courts permit le-
gal recognition of same-sex families as an incidental effect of the
larger recognition of unmarried families generally.
C. Adult Adoption
A third way in which courts have untied legal benefits from mar-
riage is by permitting the adoption of one adult by another for pur-
poses of establishing inheritance. 60 While adoption is commonly
thought of as a means for creating a legal parent-child relationship
55. 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) cert. denied, 827 P.2d 837 (N.M. 1992).
56. See 829 P.2d at 664 (recognizing that New Mexico law allows for agreements between a
biological parent and another person regarding custody of children and that the sexual orienta-
tion of the parties involved does not, as a matter of law, render such an agreement unenforce-
able and is only one of many factors in determining the best interest of the child).
57. See 829 P.2d at 663-664 (citing In re Adoption of Doe, 98 N.M. 340, 346, 648 P.2d 798,
804 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982)).
58. 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991).
59. See 829 P.2d at 665.
60. See In Re Adoption ofJames A. Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993) (approving
an adult adoption between two men made for the express purpose of formalizing their relation-
ship and "to facilitate their estate planning").
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between an adult and a minor child, the adoption of adults has been
held to be permissible under a state's adoption statute in twenty-
three states.61 The Uniform Adoption Act of 1994 also provides for
adult adoption.62 In those states where this is permissible, the re-
quirements for adult adoption vary. Some require an age difference
between the adopter and the adoptee, while others require an in-
quiry into the motive for adoption, and still others forbid adoptions
between adults engaged in illegal or immoral relationships. 63
In most of the jurisdictions that permit adult adoption, the stat-
utes guarantee inheritance, a traditional legal benefit of marriage. 64
It is not surprising that gay and lesbian couples have made use of
adult adoption as a method for obtaining this traditional benefit,
given the well-established inheritance rights of adult adoptees and
the relative ease of securing an adult adoption when it is provided
for by statute.65 Some courts have been relatively receptive to the
idea of adult adoption between same-sex partners. 66 This attitude
may be attributed simply to the fact that courts do not need to ad-
dress the parties' homosexuality or the family status of same-sex
couples to approve an adoption.67 Adoption in the United States is
exclusively a statutory creation, as the English common law never
recognized the power to adopt.68 Consequently, many adult adop-
tion statutes are clear on their face, leaving the courts little room to
maneuver. 69 Long before the gay rights movement began, well-
established precedent in several jurisdictions settled that no pre-
existing filial relationship between the adults is required to secure an
adoption, and that the motive of effectuating inheritance is proper
61. See H. Larson, Annotation, Adoption of Adult, 21 A.L.R.3d 1012, 1016-19 (1968)
(enumerating all the states that recognize adult adoption, including California, New York, and
Virginia).
62. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr art. 5 (1994).
63. SeeLarson, supra note 61, at 1025-34.
64. SeeLarson, supra note 61, at 1016.
65. SeeLarson, supranote 61, at 1016.
66. See In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993) (permitting two adult
males with 17 years of companionship to "formalize the close emotional relationship" through
Delaware's adult adoption statutes).
67. Cf. In re Adoption of Robert, 471 N.E.2d 424, 426-27 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that despite
the statutory allowance of adult adoption, to use adoption as a means of achieving legal status
for a homosexual relationship "would be a cynical distortion of the function of adoption")
(citations omitted).
68. SeeLarson, supra note 61, at 1016.
69. See In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d at 1097 (conceding that regardless of the court's
personal views, and because of the clarity of the adult adoption statutory language involved, the
role of the court "is limited to applying the statute objectively and not revising it").
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in securing an adoption.70 In general, adult adoption is not an ad-
versarial process. Thus, in any proceeding there is unlikely to be a
party interested in proving that the proposed adoption is not for a
legitimate purpose, such as an attempt to simulate a same-sex mar-
riage, which might contravene public policy. As a result, in some ju-
risdictions if one gay man petitions to adopt another and states that
his purpose is to secure the latter's inheritance as against claims
from the former's relatives, there is no reason why the adoption
should not be permitted.71
Two defects are apparent with adult adoption. The first is that
state law differs dramatically - what may be easily effected in Dela-
ware may be impossible in Texas.72 The second is a conceptual de-
fect. The few courts that have directly addressed the issue of adult
adoption between same-sex couples have stated that the desire to
give legal recognition to the sexual relationship or to simulate mar-
riage through the adoption laws is not a permissible purpose for
adult adoption.73 In effect, gay and lesbian couples must "closet"
themselves-or at least their motives-in securing the adoption.
This discomfort becomes a hurdle when state law also requires that
an adoption be in the best interest of the adoptee, as this latter re-
quirement also necessitates an inquiry into the motives for adop-
tion.74 At least one court that performed this inquiry ended up con-
cluding that the adoption was intended to simulate gay marriage,
and it voided the adoption7 5 On the other hand, at least one state
has no statutory requirement to look into the motives for the adop-
tion; and it appears that gay couples may secure valid adoptions
merely by proper pleading, for example, by claiming that the adop-
tion is intended to secure inheritance rights rather than to legitimate
their sexual relationship. 76 Since the legal recognition of gay rela-
tionships includes the goal of securing automatic inheritance, this
proper pleading will presumably be true and not merely a cover for
securing a "quasi-marriage" legal relationship.
70. SeeLarson, supra note 61, at 1016-17.
71. See In reAdoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d at 1099.
72. See id. at 1095 (upholding adoption of one adult gay man by another). Cf Grant v.
Marshall, 280 S.W.2d 559 (1955) (holding that state law forbids adult adoptions).
73. See In reAdoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d at 1099; In re Adoption of Rober 471 N.E.2d at 425,
74. See In reAdoption of Rober, 471 N.E.2d at 426 (noting that an adult adoption must still be
in the "Best Interest of the Child" and the social and emotional status of the adoptive parent are
relevant inquiries).
75. See id. at 425 (arguing that the adult adoption statute "is plainly not a quasi-matrimonial
vehide to provide nonmarried partners with a legal imprimatur for their sexual relationship").
76. See In reAdoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1097-99.
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To place adult adoption into the larger picture of the public rec-
ognition of gay and lesbian families, one should compare it to the
other two methods used by courts. Because adoption is statutory in
nature, adult adoption seems analogous to the dynamic statutory in-
terpretation of Braschi or the second-parent adoption cases. The dif-
ficulty here is that the statutory interpretation in the adult adoption
cases is strikingly undynamic. Gay couples are relying on firmly es-
tablished, and often quite old, precedents of adult adoption. In
many ways the biggest danger for gay couples is precisely that courts
may be tempted to engage in dynamic statutory interpretation and
read the adoption laws "in light of their present societal, political,
and legal context."77 Courts that have done so have been hostile to
the idea that adoption laws are used to gain legitimacy for same-sex
relationships. Thus, an attempt to modernize the law to account for
non-traditional families would probably make it more inaccessible.
The statutes and precedent on adult adoption, as in second-parent
adoption statutes, largely date from a time when legislators and
courts did not realize that gay people existed, and therefore did not
design the law to avoid helping them.78 Ironically, gay and lesbian
litigants have no incentive to bring the law up to date.
Alternatively, adult adoption may be likened to the common law
right of contract. It is tempting to say that the use of adult adoption
as a means of insuring inheritance rights between same sex couples,
though technically an act of statutory interpretation, is an offspring
of Marvin v. Marvin, since it tends to arise in non-adversarial legal
proceedings and is at some level a creature of consent. However,
again one would be ignoring the fundamental difference between
adult adoption and the other means by which courts have given gay
and lesbian couples legal recognition. Adult adoption between
same-sex partners is a modern use of an old legal method for a new
purpose, which differentiates it from both dynamic statutory inter-
pretation and the innovative use of contract.
Nonetheless, adult adoption is another means by which public en-
tities legally recognize same-sex relationships. The key to adult
adoption is its complete desexualization of the gay relationship: a
same-sex couple that overtly attempts to use this legal form to gain
recognition of the gayness of their relationship is unlikely to have
the adoption approved.79 Courts do not follow the private path of
77. Eskridge, supra note 16, at 1479.
78. See In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d at 1097 (noting that the adoption statute at issue
has existed "in equivalent form since 1915").
79. See id. at 1099 (indicating that had the couple involved stated their intention to use
adult adoption to legitimate a sexual relationship, it would be barred on public policy grounds
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using a separate form (i.e., domestic partnership instead of mar-
riage) with the express intent of validating the romantic relationship.
Instead, adult adoption permits gay and lesbian couples to use rules
of general applicability to create an incidental recognition of a rela-
tionship which in their particular case happens to be homosexual.
Certainly, the model here is different from the other methods of
public recognition of same-sex couples in that the rule of general
applicability was not intended to legitimate unmarried opposite-sex
sexual relationships in the way that, say, Marvin v. Marvin did. But it
is close enough to support the notion that public institutions recog-
nize gay and lesbian families only through the incidental application
of a rule that applies to non-marriage relationships generally.
D. Public Domestic Partnership
Courts are not the only public institutions that recognize gay and
lesbian families. Legislative entities have also taken some limited
steps toward recognizing same-sex couples in different arenas. This
recognition surfaces in primarily two forms: the creation of domestic
partnership registries, and the extension of domestic partnership
benefits to public employees.80 Domestic partnership registries serve
as an alternative to marriage by allowing unmarried couples to de-
clare themselves as a couple and thereby to gain at least some form
of legal recognition.8' The real legal implications of domestic part-
nership vary considerably with the jurisdiction, ranging from pure
symbolism to entitlement to bereavement leave and visitation rights
in state prisons and hospitals.82 Currently, Massachusetts is the only
state that has some form of domestic partner registry.83 The United
States House of Representatives allows members of the House and
their staff to register their unmarried partners (regardless of sex) as
"significant others" for purposes of House Rule 52, which prohibits
them from accepting gifts from anyone besides family and personal
against incest which makes sexual intercourse between parent and child a crime "without regard
to ... relationships by adoption").
80. Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee
Benefits for Gay Couples (and others), 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1067, 1069 n.1l (noting that the definition
of "domestic partner" varies according to state and program but generally includes "any two per-
sons who reside together and who rely on each other for financial and emotional support").
81. SeeEblin, supra note 80, at 1068-69 (noting that "domestic partner provisions lessen the
economic discrimination that results from the ban on same-sex marriages").
82. See LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF
JURISDICIIONS AND COMPANIES THAT RECOGNIZE AND/OR PROVIDE BENEFITS TO DOMESTIC
PARTNERS OF EMPLOYEES [hereinafter LAMBDA OVERVIEv] 1-2 (1996).
83. See LAMBDA OVERVIEW, supra note 82, at 1.
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friends. 84 All other domestic partner registries are municipal, and
currently at least 21 municipalities have such registries. 85
Another way in which cities or states can recognize same-sex fami-
lies is by providing domestic partnership benefits to public employ-
ees. As with domestic partner registries, the legal implications of
these benefits vary with jurisdiction.8 6 Some public employers pro-
vide only sick leave and bereavement leave, but a number provide
medical benefits as well.87 Currently, Massachusetts, New York, Ver-
mont, and at least 52 municipalities or divisions thereof provide
some form of domestic partnership benefits. 88
Although data is difficult to obtain, it appears that every domestic
partner registry in this country permits both same-sex and opposite-
sex couples to register.89 The overwhelming majority of public em-
ployers who provide domestic partnership benefits allow both same-
sex and opposite-sex couples to use them; few exceptions exist.90
Here again we note the public approach to recognizing gay and les-
bian families: domestic partnership is an untying of certain benefits
(e.g., medical, bereavement leave) from marriage, and it is made ac-
cessible to same-sex couples only because it is made accessible to
unmarried couples generally.
II: THE PRIVATE RECOGNITION OF GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES
Compared to the many ways in which government institutionalizes
marriage, private entities have a relatively constrained hand. Thus,
the discussion of how private entities have altered traditional prac-
tices to recognize same-sex families is less involved than the discus-
sion of how public entities have done so. The principal means by
which private organizations have begun to accept the legitimacy of a
gay or lesbian relationship is the granting of employee benefits by
private employers to same-sex couples in ways similar to the tradi-
84. See LAMBDA OVERVIEW, supra note 82, at 1-2.
85. See LAMBDA OVERVILV, surpa note 82, at 1. See Eblin, supra note 80, at 1072-77
(discussing several municipal plans).
86. See Hmirr Assocs., supra note 8, at 26-29.
87. See HaVTAsOCs., supra note 8, at 26-28; LAMBDA OVERVIEW, supra note 82, at 2-3.
88. SeeHEVITrASSOCS., supra note 8, at 2-3, 26-28.
89. See Hvrrr ASSOCS., supra note 8, at 2-3, 26-28. The study by the Hewitt Associates,
cited here, is the most comprehensive to date on the issue of domestic partnership, but even it
is incomplete.
90. See HEVrrr ASSOCS., supra note 8, at 26-27. The City of Denver, Colorado, recently
added itself to this list of exceptions. Seejames Brooke, Denver Extends Health Coverage to Partners
of Gay City Employees Nv YORK TIngs, Sept. 18, 1996, at A17 (summarizing Denver Mayor Wel-
lington Webb's signing of an ordinance granting health insurance to gay partners).
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tional granting of benefits to married couples.91 The past fifteen
years saw the birth of private domestic partnership benefits, which
appeared slowly at first but began a dramatic increase in the last five
years.92
Empirical data on private domestic partnership plans are ex-
tremely scarce. A 1994 research paper by the Hewitt Associates and
its subsequent 1996 update represent the most comprehensive sur-
veys presently available.93 The survey and the update together enu-
merate 173 private U.S. employers that provide some form of domes-
tic partnership benefits.94 This number is less than the total number
of such employers. However, if one assumes that the Hewitt Associ-
ates' survey and update are methodologically honest, and that their
informational incompleteness did not bias the results to favor certain
kinds of employer benefit systems, one may take the studies as repre-
sentative of actual trends in the workplace. The studies indicate that
the average annual increase in the number of employers giving do-
mestic partnership benefits to their employees during the 1994-96
period was 460% of the average annual increase in the 1982-1994 pe-
riod.95 Therefore the conclusion that domestic partnership is on the
rise can readily be made. These studies also indicate that during the
1982-1994 period, a slight majority of private employers who began
to give such benefits allowed only same-sex couples to register, while
the 1994-96 period saw a great increase. 96 The studies, however, do
not indicate whether any employers changed that eligibility require-
ment. In short, today a solid majority of private employers that pro-
vide domestic partnership benefits allow only same-sex couples to
register, and this majority is increasing.
The private approach to domestic partnership clearly differs from
the public approach. Public entities will recognize gay and lesbian
couples only as a subclass of unmarried people, whereas the majority
of private employers who provide domestic partnership benefits dis-
tinguish between gay and straight unmarried couples. The private
91. This refers to family health insurance, medical benefits, or any form of benefit that is
extended to an employee as a member of a couple.
92. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
93. See Raquel Santiago, Survey: Employers Save Significanty with HMOs, CRAIN'S CLEV. BUS.,
Jan. 13, 1997, at 6 (recounting the thoroughness of Hewitt Associates' survey on employee
benefits).
94. See HEwIrrASSOCS., supra note 8, at 1-2, 20-25.
95. Private employers first began to provide domestic partnership benefits in 1982. See El-
bin, supra note 80, at 1078 (noting that the Village Voice, a newspaper company, provided
medical and dental benefits beginning in 1982); See also supra note 7.
96. According to the Hewitt study, 94% of employers who began to provide such benefits
allowed only same-sex couples to register.
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approach uses domestic partnership as a gay alternative to marriage,
not as a generalized sub-marriage status for a relationship.
III: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE APPROACHES
The public and private approaches represent very different ideas
of what it means to legitimate gay and lesbian relationships. On a
theoretical level, the private approach appears to be an attempt by
private citizens to undo some of the discriminatory effects of the
marriage laws. By extending employer recognition to married oppo-
site-sex couples and same-sex domestic partners, but not to unmar-
ried opposite-sex couples, an employer is in a sense equating the
same-sex relationship with the married relationship. This is a very
strong validation of the legitimacy of gay and lesbian couples.97
Conversely, the public approach creates a two-tiered system of rela-
tionships. Marriage brings the highest degree of legal recognition
and is available only to heterosexuals. Only the lesser status of do-
mestic partnership is open to gays and lesbians. This scheme pro-
vides for unequal treatment of gay and straight relationships: It
equates gay relationships with unmarried straight couples, thereby
emphasizing the homophobic view that same-sex relationships are
impermanent and unworthy of the legitimation that marriage brings
to straight relationships.
A. Explanations for the Difference
It may be that the public and private approaches are actually moti-
vated by the symbolism they create. There may be only a few public
officeholders in the country willing to risk the political backlash
from placing same-sex relationships on a par with marriage. They ac-
cept the fact that gays and lesbians may be allowed to have the same
entitlements as heterosexual unmarried couples only because such
an approach does not really legitimate same-sex families. This politi-
cal fear of endorsing gay marriage is hardly unreasonable. When the
Supreme Court of Hawaii indicated a few years ago that Hawaii's
constitution might require same-sex marriages, 98 the federal gov-
ernment quickly acted to prevent Hawaii's law from forcing other
97. See generally Mary Curtius & Larry B. Stammer, Archbishop Challenges S.F. Domestic Partners
Law Religion: He Vows to Sue if Catholic Charities is [sic] Not Exempted From Giving Spousal Benefits to
Employees' Companions. Mayor Says There Will Be No Exceptions, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997,
at A3 (affirming San Francisco's legal recognition of gay relationships).
98. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68 (holding that Hawaii's opposite-sex marriage law discriminated
on the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny).
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states to recognize such marriages.99 Employers, however, may have
contrary motivations. One may speculate that more liberal corpora-
tions and firms will be the ones that provide domestic partnership
benefits, and they may affirmatively desire to equate same-sex rela-
tionships with marriage.
Additionally, compelling institutional explanations exist. Public
recognition of unmarried couples often takes the form of legal enti-
tlements that do not cost the government anything, such as inheri-
tance rights, hospital visitation rights, or a claim to a rent-controlled
apartment. As a result, there is no real incentive for the government
to restrict those benefits to a narrow class of people, such as gays and
lesbians, assuming it desires to make certain legal benefits available
to gay and lesbian couples. From a political point of view, it seems
advantageous to make any benefits that are available to gays and les-
bians also available to unmarried heterosexuals. Such an expansion
of benefits to the entire class of unmarried people fulfills the twin
goals of allowing same-sex couples certain legal benefits without trig-
gering conservative political responses from equating gay and mar-
ried couples. Its only cost is symbolism. This explanation, obviously,
does not work as well in accounting for medical benefits that some
public employers provide to unmarried couples, since those do cost
the government money. The political problem remains, however, we
might expect that political institutions would be more sensitive to
political influences than economic considerations.
On the other hand, private employers are likely to have the oppo-
site preferences. Notwithstanding the occasional homophobic pub-
lic attacks on corporations that grant domestic partnership bene-
fits,100 most employer policies go unnoticed by the public at large.
Moreover, the public has little control over them. Economic incen-
tives, however, are likely to influence private employers, particularly
because private employers, unlike the government, usually recognize
couples only in ways that usually carry costs.101 Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to expect that an employer interested in treating heterosex-
ual and homosexual employees equally, yet still wishing to remain
cost-conscious, will restrict domestic partnership benefits to same-sex
99. SeeDefense of Marriage Act, supra note 2.
100. The Walt Disney Corporation, for example, was the target of a boycott by Christian
conservatives after it decided to extend domestic partnership benefits to its gay and lesbian em-
ployees. See Mike Clary andJames Bates, Moral Crusading. Conservative Christians Shun Disney over
Gay-Partner Policy, Los ANGELES TIMES, December 25, 1995, at DI (noting the irony that Disney
was criticized by other Hollywood studios for changing its domestic partnership policy too
slowly).
101. See HEWITrASSOcS., supra note 8, at 7.
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couples. Indeed, one study has indicated that cost is the single big-
gest concern employers voice about domestic partnership bene-
fits.102
B. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIFFERENCE
The legal consequences of the different public and private ap-
proaches to gay and lesbian families are striking. Given that courts
are willing to recognize gay and lesbian families only by way of their
membership in the class of unmarried people, a certain civil rights
litigation strategy follows from this observation. A lawsuit seeking le-
gal recognition of a same-sex couple as family, regardless of whether
it is a suit to adopt, or to gain unemployment benefits, has a good
chance of success only if an unmarried heterosexual couple could
file an exactly identical suit.10 3 In fact, it may be strategically prefer-
able for an unmarried heterosexual couple to file such a suit first;, for
as we have noted, such suits can pave the way for later suits by gays
and lesbians.
Another consequence of the public approach to recognizing same-
sex families is that over time, it threatens to destroy the institution of
marriage entirely. When private employers grant benefits to same-
sex couples as they do to married couples, they continue to preserve
the sharp distinction between being married and being single for het-
erosexuals. When public entities detach a benefit from marriage and
give it to all unmarried couples, however, they water down the sig-
nificance of marriage for everyone. Marriage loses certain legal con-
sequences and gradually becomes more of a symbolic status. Some
gay and lesbian civil rights activists might applaud this complete de-
struction of marriage as the final liberation of private relationships
from governmental control. 1°4 Another viewpoint is that the attain-
ment of legal maritial status for same-sex couples is undermined by
this trend. That is, if one day gays and lesbians get the legal right to
marry, that right may not be worth anything anymore. Indeed, if
one motivation of the public approach is to provide gays and lesbi-
ans some equality without taking the politically dangerous step of, for
102. See HEWIrrAssocS., supra note 8, at 7.
103. Indeed, at least one gay rights advocacy group appears to have adopted this strategy.
The Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders filed an amicus curie brief in Reep v. Commis-
sioner of Dept. of Employment and Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297 (Mass. 1992), a Massachusetts
case involving a claim for employment benefits by the unmarried opposite-sex partner of an em-
ployee.
104. Cf Wolfson, supra note 3, passim (discussing the variety of views that gay rights activists
have on marriage; for instance, some contend that "marriage simply represents an expression of
love and committment that was neither herosexual or homosexual," and others assert that mar-
riage is "inherently problematic").
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instance, striking down the marriage laws as unconstitutional, the
public approach will in the long run amount to a social decision to
destroy marriage rather than let gays and lesbians have it.
From the gay rights perspective, the public approach is probably a
mistake. It may be the only politically viable way to get some legal
recognition of gay and lesbian families in the short term, but it is
hardly a long-term path to true equality for same-sex couples. Courts
and legislatures might prove themselves willing to significantly water
down the legal significance of marriage, but there will always be
some benefits that adhere to marriage that are denied to unmarried
couples. As a consequence, the public approach will forever exclude
gays and lesbians from these benefits. Furthermore, no matter how
many of the traditional benefits of marriage are decoupled from
marriage (under the public approach) and made available to unmar-
ried couples generally, the symbolic significance of marriage remains
strong in this country. As long as same-sex couples cannot be mar-
ried, they will not have the same rights as opposite-sex couples.
The proper path for government is to do as private employers have
done and simply equate same-sex couples with married opposite-sex
couples. To date, only one court in the country has indicated a will-
ingness to go down such a path. In Baehr v. Lewin,105 the Hawaii Su-
preme Court held that Hawaii's marriage law (which, like all mar-
riage laws, allows only opposite-sex couples to marry) discriminates
on the basis of sex, and the court remanded for a determination of
whether there was a compelling state interest to justify that discrimi-
nation.10 6 If the Hawaii Supreme Court ultimately holds that the
state's marriage law violates the state constitution, that decision will
be the first one to open up every legal entitlement of marriage to
same-sex couples. Gay and lesbian couples will finally walk in the
front door to legal recognition of their families, instead of having to
rely on the granting of legal benefits to unmarried couples generally.
This would amount to transplanting the private approach into the
public realm.
IV: CONCLUSION
Public and private entities have taken different approaches to rec-
ognizing gay and lesbian families. While the majority of public enti-
ties do not recognize gay and lesbian families at all, those that do,
view them as unmarried families generally. By contrast, private enti-
105. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
106. See id. (involving same-sex couples, who were denied marriage licenses; these plaintiffs
argued that the denial constitutes a violation of their right of privacy and equal protection).
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ties tend not to recognize unmarried heterosexual couples. Those
employers that grant some recognition to gay and lesbian families by
and large recognize them as a gay alternative to marriage. Even
when same-sex couples do not receive the full employee benefits that
married couples do, when they receive any benefits at all, they tend
to receive benefits from which heterosexual unmarried couples are
completely excluded. Moreover, these different mechanisms for
recognizing gay and lesbian families have implications for civil rights
litigation strategies and for the future of marriage generally. While
the institutional explanations for public and private behavior gener-
ally help explain why public and private entities behave in these ways,
one significant public entity (the Hawaii Supreme Court) seems to
have adopted the private approach to recognizing gay and lesbian
families. Hopefully, more courts will follow this path, as it is the only
long-term guarantee of equal rights for gay and lesbian families.

